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WATERS AND WATER COURSES - TORTS - OWNERS OF PROPERTY
DAMAGED BY UNLAWFUL DITCHING OR UNREASONABLE DISCHARGE
OF WATERS MAY OBTAIN RELIEF BY STATUTE OR BY THE TORT
CONCEPT OF REASONABLE USE
Between 1967 and 1974 landowners in LaMoure County
severally and in some instances jointly constructed a series of
drainage ditches from the numerous natural ponds, sloughs, and
depressions on their land.I The landowners' ditching caused water
to deposit in a natural depression on plaintiff Young's land.
2
Section 61-01-22 of the North Dakota Century Code required a
permit to drain a pond, slough, or lake that comprised a total
watershed of eighty acres or more.3 Young brought an action and
alleged that the landowners drained ponds and sloughs in violation
1. Young v. Hamilton, 332 N.W.2d 237, 239 (N.D. 1983). The landowners named defendants
were Ella Hamilton, Charles Hamilton, Oliver Schweigert, Sebastian Wald, Leo Wald, Allan Wald,
Patrick Wald, and the May Overby estate. 332 N.W.2d at 239 n. 1.
2. Id. at 239. Young owned and farmed a quarter section of land in LaMoure County, North
Dakota that had a natural depression in the north-east corner. The depression on Young's land was
lower than the depressions on the defendants' lands. Id.
3. N.D. CENT. CODE S 61-01-22 (1960) (current version at N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-16.1-41
(Supp. 1983)). Section 61-01-22 of the North Dakota Century Code in effect at the time of the actions
in Young stated in pertinent part as follows:
Any person, public or private corporation, proposing to drain waters from a pond,
slough or lake, which impounds waters gathered therein and drained from an area
comprising eighty acres or more into a natural watercourse, as defined by section 61-
01-06, or into a draw or natural drainway, before constructing a ditch or facility for
the purpose of such drainage shall submit to the state water conservation commission
an application for a permit to do so.
Id. Section 61-01-22 was repealed in 1981. Act of Mar. 26, 1981, N.D. Sess. Laws 1713. The current
version appears at § 61-16.1-41 of the North Dakota Century Code. N.D.CENT. CODE § 61-16.1-41
(Supp. 1983). The current version retains the basic concept that a permit is required to drain a pond,
slough, or lake if the combined water shed is greater than eighty acres. See id.
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of section 61-01-22 of the North Dakota Century Code and that the
resultant drainage was unnatural and unreasonable.4  Young
further alleged that the landowners' actions damaged crops and.
farmland and decreased the value of his farming operations.5
Young requested $20,000 actual damages and $100,000 exemplary
damages. Young also sought an order enjoining the landowners
from discharging drainage waters on and across his land and
requiring the landowners to fill existing ditches or provide a
suitable alternative outlet. 6 The LaMoure County District Court
entered judgment in favor of the landowners and Young appealed. 7
The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed and remanded and
held that whether to apply the North Dakota Century Code or the
reasonable use rule8 depends on the circumstances of the facts at
hand. 9 The court also found that under the reasonable use rule,
Young's inequitable conduct did not totally bar recovery and
Young's mitigation of harm to his land did not preclude further
consideration. 10 Young v. Hamilton, 332 N.W.2d 237 (N.D. 1983).
Three doctrines of surface water law can apply to drainage
situations. 1 The oldest of the three doctrines is the civil law rule,
which first appeared in a common law jurisdiction in 1848.12 The
civil law rule states that the owner of the highland or dominant
estate has a natural easement or servitude in the low lying or
servient estate. 13 The easement allows the owner of the dominant
estate to discharge all natural waters flowing or accumulating upon
4. 332 N.W.2d at 239. The court's initial consideration was whether § 61-01-22 of the North
Dakota Century Code applied to the fact situation in Young. Id. at 240.
5. Id. at 239. Young contended that if the drainage continued, large portions of his land would
.become useless for agriculture. Id.
6. Id. The alternative outlet that Young requested would have provided for drainage over the
east Overby land and into a creek. Id.
7. Id. at 240.
8. The reasonable use rule provides that a landowner may use his property for drainage so long
as his use does not injure the rights of others. Jones v. Boeing Co., 153 N.W.2d 897, 903 (N.D.
1967).
9. 332 N.W.2d at 241-42. A finding of fact was necessary before the court could apply either S
61-01-22 or reasonable use guidelines. Id. at 241. Statutory law requiring a permit is utilized if the
drainage area is greater than eighty acres. Reasonable use guidelines are utilized in instances not
covered by statute. Id. at 241.
10. Id. at 243. The court stated that mitigation of harm may affect the amount of damages or
type ofreliefa party may recover, but it did not totally preclude recovery. Id. at 243-44.
11. Comment, The Flow of SuJace Water Law in Connecticut, 14 CONN. L. REV. 601 (1981-82).
Three prevailing doctrines exist in surface water cases: the common enemy rule, the civil law rule,
and the reasonable use rule. All three doctrines developed in the nineteenth century when
nonagricultural land development was increasing. Id. at 607. For a discussion of the three surface
water doctrines, see Note, Surface Water Drainage, 36 NOTRE DAME LAW. 518 (1960-61); Hands,
Kinyon, & McClure, Interferences with Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L. REV. 891 (1940). For a discussion
ofjurisdictions' applying the three doctrines, see Annot., 93 A.L.R. 3d 1193 (Supp. 1983).
12. Comment, supra note 11, at 607. The first common law jurisdiction to apply the civil law
rule was Pennsylvania. See Martin v. Riddle, 26 Pa. 415 (1848). Louisiana, however, applied the
civil law rule earlier. See Orleans Navigation Co. v. New Orleans, 2 Mart. (n.s.) 214 (1812).
Louisiana's law is based primarily on the Napoleonic Code. Comment, supra note 11, at 607.
13. Nininger v. Norwood, 72 Ala. 277 (1882). In Nininger the plaintiff sought to abate the
defendant's embankment and ditches, which caused flooding of the plaintiff's lands. Id. at 278. The
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his land onto the land of the servient owner.1 4 If the dominant
landowner altered the natural flow of water, however, he would be
liable for all damage caused to the lower servient estate. 15 Nineteen
jurisdictions currently apply some form of the civil law rule
concerning surface water. 16 The rationale of the civil law rule is
that both parties acquired the property with full knowledge that
water flows and rises in nature and that the lower estate is
accordingly burdened.1 7 The civil law rule, however, has been
criticized for its inflexibility. 
18
Eleven jurisdictions subscribe to some form of the common
enemy rule of surface water.1 9 Dean Prosser states the common
enemy rule as follows: "[A] landowner may deal with surface water
as he sees fit regardless of the effect upon adjoining land." 2 ° Under
civil law surface water doctrine does not allow interference or obstruction by the servient owner; any
interference subjects the servient estate to liability. The common law surface water doctrine,
however, allows the owner of the servient or lower estate to lawfully obstruct or hinder the natural
flow of water. Id. at 283.
14. Id. at 284.
15. Jones v. Boeing Co., 153 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1969) (any artificial alternation or acceleration
of surface waters would make the dominant estate liable).
16. The following apply some form of the civil law rule: Alabama (see Delde v. Vann, 279 Ala.
153, 182 So.2d 885 (1966)); Arizona (see Vantex Land & Dev. v. Schneps, 82 Ariz. 54, 308 P.2d 254
(1957)); Colorado (see Engelwood v. Linkenheil, 146 Colo. 493, 362 P.2d 186 (1961)); Florida (see
Kroger Properties, Inc. v. Allen, 314 So.2d 792 (Fla. 1975)); Georgia (see McMillen Rev. Corp. v.
Bull, 228 Ga. 826, 188 S.E.2d 491 (1972)); Idaho (see Dayley v. Burley, 96 Idaho 101, 524 P.2d 1073
(1974)); Illinois (see Templeton v. Huss, 57 Il1. App. 2d 134, 311 N.E.2d 141 (1974)); Iowa (see
Braverman v. Eicher, 238 N.W.2d 331 (Iowa 1976)); Kansas (see Baldwin v. Overland Park, 205
Kan. 1, 468 P.2d 168 (1970)); Louisiana (see Poole v. Guste, 261 La. 1110, 262 So.2d 339 (1972));
Michigan (see Allen v. Morris Bldg. Co., 360 Mich. 214, 103 N.W.2d 491 (1960)); Mississippi (see
Alabama Great S. Ry. Co. v. Broach, 238 Miss. 618, 119 So. 2d 923 (1960)); New Mexico (see
Martinez v. Cook, 56 N.M. 343, 244 P.2d 134 (1952)); Oregon (see Kahl v. Texaco, Inc., 281 Or.
337, 574 P.2d 650 (1978)); Pennsylvania (see Westbury Realty Corp. v. Lancaster Shopping Center,
Inc. 396 Pa. 383, 152 A.2d 669 (1959)); Tennessee (see Butts v. South Fulton, 565 S.W.2d 879
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1977)); Texas (see Carter v. Lee, 502 S.W.2d 925 (Texas 1973)); Vermont (see
Scanlan v. Hopkins, 128 Vt. 626, 270 A.2d 352 (1970)); West Virginia (see Tierncy v. Earl, 153 W.
Va. 790, 172 S.E.2d 558 (1970)).
17. Nininger v. Norwood, 72 Ala. 277, 284 (1882). See also Kauffman v. Griesemer, 26 Pa. 407
(1856). In Kauffman the court explained the rationale of the civil law rule as follows:
Almost the whole law of watercourses is founded on the maxim of the common law
"Agua currit, et debet currere." Because water is descendible by nature, the owner of
a dominant or superior heritage has an easement in the servient or inferior tenement
for the discharge of all waters which by nature rise in or flow or fall upon the superior.
Id. at 412.
18. See Hands, Kinyon, & McClure, supra note 11. The civil law rule, if strictly applied, is
inflexible since liability ensues if a landowner modifies the natural drainage of land in any way. Id. at
913. The commentators believe that many courts have developed modifications of the civil law rule
and the common enemy rule that are as arbitrary and inflexible as the rules themselves. Id.
19. The following jurisdictions apply some form of the common enemy rule: Arkansas (see Smith
v. Cruthis, 255 Ark. 217, 499 S.W.2d 852 (1973)); District of Columbia (see Ballard v. Ace Wrecking
Co., 289 A.2d 888 (App. D.C. 1972)); Maine (seeJohnson v. Whitten, 384 A.2d 698 (Me. 1978));
Missouri (see Minton v. Steakley, 466 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971)); Montana (see Tillinger v.
Frisbie, 138 Mont. 60, 353 P.2d 645 (1969)); Nebraska (see Paasch v. Brown, 190 Neb. 421, 208
N.W.2d 695 (1973)); New York (see Treadwell v. Waldeier, 34 Misc. 2d 339, 228 N.Y.S. 2d 390,
(1962)); Oklahoma (see Conkin v. Ruth, 581 P.2d 923 (Okl. Ct. App. 1976)); South Carolina (see
Morris v. Townsend, 262 S.C. 628, 172 S.E.2d 819 (1970)); Virginia (see McCayley v. Phillips, 216
Va. 450, 219 S.E.2d 854 (1975)); Washington (see Wilber Dev. Corp. v. Les Rowland Constr., Inc.,
83 Wash. 2d 871, 523 P.2d 186 (1974)).
20. W. PROSSEI, LAW OF TORTS § 88, n.20, at 582 (4th ed. 1971).
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the common enemy rule a landowner can artificially alter or
concentrate the flow of water without liability. 2 The theory
supporting the common enemy rule is that an adjoining
landowner's right to discharge surface waters cannot have legal
existence except from a legal grant, express or implied.
22
The common enemy rule encourages the full use and
exploitation of land. 23 A major flaw with the rule, however, is that
it forces adjoining landowners to bear the burden of surface water
expulsion rather than the landowners who undertake the
improvement projects.
24
Courts are reluctant to strictly apply the civil law rule or the
common enemy rule when it would cause an inequitable result.
Thus, a hybrid law developed that is labeled the reasonable use
doctrine. 25 The Minnesota Supreme Court in Sheehan v. Flynn
26
defined the reasonable use doctrine as follows: "This is a
reasonable doctrine, that takes into consideration all the
circumstances of each case. It gives each man the common law
right to improve and enjoy his own property to its fullest extent, but
limited by the requirement that he use reasonable care in disposing
of surface water. "127
In the past the reasonable use rule was often considered only a
modification of the common law rule, but over time it attained a
distinct and independent status. 28 Most modern reasonable use
21. Jones v. Boeing Co., 153 N.W.2d 896 (N.D. 1967). In Jones the court cited a common
enemy doctrine case, which stated that the defendant landowner could artificially alter his property
and suffer no liability. Id. at 903 (citing Lemer v. Koble, 86 N.W.2d 44 (N.D. 1957)).
22. Bowlsby v. Speer, 31 N.J.L. 351, 352-53 (1865). In Bowlsby the defendant's pond
overflowed on to the plaintiff's land, and flooded the plaintiff's cellar. Id. at 352. The Bowlsby court
stated that the plaintiff could claim no legal right in the mere natural flow of surface water and that
neither its retention, diversion, repulsion, or altered transmission was an actionable injury even
though damage ensued. Id. at 352-53.
23. Id. at 353.
24. Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4, 9 (1956). In Armstrong a building
contractor artificially gathered and discharged surface waters into a natural stream bordering the
plaintiff's property. The discharge caused erosion to the plaintiff's land and threatened the plaintiff's
house, which was situated on the bank of the stream. Id. at __, 120 A.2d at 6. The court stated that
social progress and the common well being are better served by a just and right balancing of the
competing interests. Those who benefit and profit by the projects rather than the adjoining
landowners should pay the costs. Id. at __, 120 A.2d at 10. The common enemy rule also
encourages self-help by the servient estate owner to stop the flow of water. See King v. Cade, 205
Okla. 666, 240-P.2d 88 (1957) (defendants built dam to stop water flow).
25. See Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, -, 120 A.2d 4, 9 (1956). The development
of reasonable use in many jurisdictions occurred when courts qualified the existing civil law rule or
common law rule because it was unjust. Id.
26. 59 Minn. 436, 61 N.W. 462 (1894). In Sheehan the defendant drained a depression on his
land into a lake bordering the plaintiff's land, thus raising the water level of the lake and submerging
some of the plaintiff's agricultural land. Sheehan v. Flynn, 59 Minn. 436, -, 61 N.W. 462, 462
(1894).
27. Id. at __ 61 N.W. at 463.
28. See Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 32 N.W.2d 286 (1948). In Enderson the defendant
drained several depressions on his land into a slough. The water then flowed onto the plaintiff's
pasture land and flooded 27 acres. Id. at __, 32 N.W.2d at 288. The court stated that the
reasonable use rule had been inaccurately characterized as a modification of the common law rule,
but that it now has an independent status. Id. at-__, 32 N.W.2d at 289.
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cases set forth well defined guidelines that courts can use to
determine the reasonableness of the surface water discharge.
29
Reasonableness guidelines often include determining whether
reasonable necessity requires the drainage and balancing the
burden against the benefit of the drainage.30 In addition, the issue
of reasonableness of the drainage becomes a question of fact that a
court will determine after considering all relevant factors in the
case.
31
The most often quoted modern definition of reasonable use is
in Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 32 which states the rule as follows:
"[E]ach possessor is legally privileged to make a reasonable use of
his land, even though the flow of surface waters is altered thereby
and causes some harm to others, but incurs liability when his
harmful interference is unreasonable. 33 Unlike the civil law rule
or the common enemy rule, the reasonable use rule takes into
account natural drainage as well as artificially altered drainage, as
long as both are a reasonable use. 34  Presently, twenty-one
jurisdictions have adopted some form of the reasonable use rule.
3 5
29. Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956). Relevant factors listed by the
Armstrong court concerning the amount of harm caused included foreseeability of the harm and
purpose or motive. Id. at -, 120 A.2d at 10. Other jurisdictions, such as Minnesota, outline
guidelines courts may consider in deciding reasonableness. The Minnesota Supreme Court in
Enderson v. Kelehan outlined the following four guidelines to determine reasonableness of the drainage:
(a) There is a reasonable necessity for such drainage;
(b) If reasonable care be taken to avoid unnecessary injury to the land receiving the
burden;
(c) If the utility or benefit accruing to the land drained reasonably outweighs the
gravity of the harm resulting to the land receiving the burden; and
(d) If, where practicable, it is accomplished by reasonably improving and aiding the
normal and natural system of drainage according to its reasonable carrying
capacity, or if, in the absence of a practicable natural drain, a reasonable and
feasible artificial drainage system is adopted.
Enderson, 226 Minn. at __ , 32 N.W.2d at 289 (footnote omitted).
30. Enderson, 226 Minn. at-.., 32 N.W.2d at 289.
31. Id. The Enderson court stated that the reasonable use rule cannot be reduced to formulaic
principles, but must remain flexible. Each case must bejudged on its own unique facts. Id.
32. 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4(1956). In Armstrong a building contractor drained surface and
percolating waters from his land. The drainage eroded the banks of a stream and threatened the
plaintiffs' house, which was situated near the stream. Armstrong v. Francis corp., 20 NJ. 320,
__,120 A.2d 4, 6 (1956).
33. Id. at __, 120 A.2d at 8. Prior to Armstrong only Minnesota and New Hampshire classified
surface water liability as a tort liability. Id. See Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862);
Sheehan v. Flynn, 59 Minn. 436, 61 N.W. 462 (1894).
34. Armstrong, 20 N.J. at __ , 120 A.2d at 9-10.
35. The following states have adopted some form of the reasonable use rule: Alaska (see
Weinberg v. Northern Alaska Dev. Corp., 384 P.2d 450 (Alaska 1963)); California. (see Ellison v.
San Buenaventura, 50 Cal. App. 3d 453, 131 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1976)); Connecticut (see Page Motor
Co. v. Baker, 182 Conn. 484, 438 A.2d 739 (1980)); Delaware (see Weldin Farms, Inc. v. Glassman,
414 A.2d 500 (Del. 1980)); Georgia (see Uniroyal, Inc. v. Hood, 588 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1979));
Hawaii (see Rodrigtes v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970)); Indiana (see Rounds v.
Hoelscher, 428 N.E.2d 1308 (Ind. 1981)); Kentucky (see Dept. of Highways v. S & M Land Co.,
503 S.W.2d 495 (Ky. 1972)); Maryland (see Mark Downs, Inc. v. McCormick Properties, Inc. 51
Md. App. 171, 441 A.2d 1119 (1982)); Massachusetts (see Tucker v. Badoian, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh.
3207, 384 N.E.2d 1195 (1978)); Minnesota (see Pell v. Nelson, 294 Minn. 363, 201 N.W.2d 136
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Courts' reasons for adoption of the reasonable use rule include
the rule's inherent flexibility. 36 The reasonable use rule is flexible
since the issue of reasonableness becomes a question of fact
determined in each case upon a consideration of all relevant
considerations.3 7 Moreover, the reasonable use rule allows the
party benefiting from the drainage to pay the cost of the economic
development of the land: hence, the reasonable use rule is also
equitable .38
The development of the reasonable use rule in North Dakota
originated in 1967 in Jones v. Boeing Co. 3 9 Prior to Jones, North
Dakota had both the civil law rule and common enemy rule as
precedent.4 0 In Jones, however, the North Dakota Supreme Court
rejected the civil law rule and the common enemy rule as inflexible
and harsh, and adopted the reasonable use rule as expressed by the
New Jersey Supreme Court.4 1 In Armstrong v. Francis Corp.42 the
New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the view set forth in two
Minnesota cases. 43  The Minnesota precedent makes
reasonableness a question of fact determined in each case upon
consideration of all relevant factors.4 4  One of the key
elements of North Dakota reasonable use law is, therefore, that
reasonableness is a question of fact determined from all relevant
circumstances.
In 1971 the North Dakota Supreme Court in Jacobsen v.
(1962)); Nevada (see County ot'Clark v. Powers, 611 P.2d 1062 (Nev. 1980)); New Hampshire (see
Micucci v. White Mountain Trust Co., 114 N.H. 436, 321 A.2d 573 (1974)); New Jersey (see
Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 NJ. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956)); North Carolina (see Wilkinson v.
Charles Investment Co., 58 N.C. App. 213, 268 S.E.2d 263 (1980)); North Dakota (see Jones v.
Boeing Co., 153 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1967)); Ohio (see McGlashan v. Spade Rockledge Terrace
Condo Dev. Corp., 62 Ohio St.2d 55, 402 N.E.2d 1196 (1980)); Rhode Island (see Butler v. Bruno,
115 R.I. 264, 341 A.2d 735 (1975)); South Dakota (see Mulder v. Tague, 85 S.D. 544, 186 N.W.2d
884 (1971)); Texas (see Houston v. Renault, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1968)); Utah (see Sanford v.
University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971)); Wisconsin (see Getka v. Lader, 71 Wis.
2d 237, 238 N.W.2d 87 (1976)).
36. Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956).
37. SeeJones v. Boeing Co., 153 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1967). The North Dakota Supreme Court
in Jones stated that social progress was better served by general principles of fairness and common
sense that attended the application of the rule of reason. Id. at 904.
38. Id.
39. 153 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1967). In Jones the defendant constructed a trailer park that
concentrated the flow of surface waters over the plaintiff's land. Jones v. Boeing Co., 153 N.W.2d
897, 903 (N.D. 1967).
40. Id. at 903. See Henderson v. Hines, 48 N.D. 152, 162, 183 N.W. 531, 535 (1921)
(established the common enemy rule that existed prior to adoption of the reasonable use rule);
Rynestad v. Clemetson, 133 N.W.2d 559, 565 (N.D. 1965) (established the basic civil law rule of
surface water that existed in North Dakota prior to 1967).
41. 153 N.W.2d at 904. The court stated that the adoption of the reasonable use rule was not a
change in policy; rather, it was a clarification of the rationale followed in prior decisions. Id.
42. 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956). In Armstrong a building contractor drained surface and
percolating waters thereby eroding the banks of a stream threatening plaintiff's house situated near
the stream. Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1948).
43. Id. at __, 120 A.2d at 10. See Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 32 N.W.2d 286 (1948)
(reasonable use is a question of fact), Sheehan v. Flynn, 59 Minn. 436, 61 N.W. 462 (1894)
(reasonable use determined by all relevant circumstances).
44. Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, -, 120 A.2d 4, 10 (1948).
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Pedersen45 affirmed the reasonable use rule ofJones and expanded the
rule to include reasonable use guidelines.4 6 In addition, the North
Dakota Supreme Court stated that section 61-01-22 of the North
Dakota Century Code applies when the drainage is from a pond,
slough, or lake with a drainage area greater than eighty acres. 47
The direct confrontation between the reasonable use rule and
the North Dakota Century Code first appeared in Barr v. Barnes
County Board of County Commissioners. 48 In Barr the defendant drained
an area greater than eighty acres around Goose Lake without a
permit. 49  Hence, the defendants were liable for damages
attributable to drainage of a lake with a watershed greater than
eighty acres under section 61-01-22 of the North Dakota Century
Code even though the drainage would have been permissible under
the reasonable use rule set forth in Jacobsen v. Pedersen. 5 0 The reason
for section 61-01-22, which prohibits drainage without permits, was
to prevent what occurred in Barr: the draining of a lake without
thoroughly investigating the effects of drainage. 
51
In Young v. Hamilton52 the North Dakota Supreme Court's
initial consideration was whether section 61-01-22 of the North
Dakota Century Code or the reasonable use rule applied to the fact
situation. 53 The trial court, however, failed to find whether
defendants drained a pond, slough, or lake with a watershed
greater than eighty acres. The North Dakota Supreme Court thus
concluded that a finding of fact was necessary to determine the
45. 190 N.W.2d I (N.D. 1971). In Jacobsen the defendants streamlined the natural drainage on
their property in accordance with reasonable use, but were enjoined from draining lakes without a
permit. Jacobsen v. Pedersen, 190 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1971).
46. Id. at 1. North Dakota has adopted the same reasonableness guidelines as Minnesota. Id. at
6. See supra note 29 for an outline of the reasonable use guidelines.
47. Id. at 7. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 61-01-22 (1960) (current version at N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-
16.1-41 (Supp. 1983)). The North Dakota Legislature amended § 61-01-22 in 1975 and 1977, and
repealed it in 1981. See Act of Mar. 26, 1981, N.D. Sess. Laws 1713 (repeal of § 61-01-22); Act of
April 21, 1977, N.D. Sess. Laws 1203 (amendment of 5 61-01-22); Act of Mar. 27, 1975, N.D. Sess.
Laws 1488 (amendment of § 61-01-22). Section 61-16.1-41 provides:
Any person draining, or causing to be drained, water of a pond, slough, or lake, or
any series thereof, which drains an area comprising eighty acres . . . or more, without
first securing a permit to do so, as provided by this section, shall be liable for all
damage sustained by any person caused by such draining, and shall be guilty of an
infraction ....
N.D. CENT. CODE §61-16.1-41 (Supp. 1983).
48. 194 N.W.2d 744 (N.D. 1972). In Barr the defendant constructed a drainage ditch without a
permit in violation of 5 61-01-22 of the North Dakota Century Code, causing 203 acres of the
plaintiffs agricultural land to flood. Barr v. Barnes County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 194 N.W.2d
744, 746 (N.D. 1972).
49. Id. at 749.
50. Id.
51. Id. Section 61-01-22 of the North Dakota Century Code was enacted to prevent drainage
without a permit. Obtaining a permit would require a thorough investigation of the effect the
drainage would have downstream. Id.
52. 332 N.W.2d 237 (N.D. 1983).
53. Youngv. Hamilton, 332 N.W.2d 237 (N.D. 1983).
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applicable law.5 4 Once the court made a finding of fact, it could
utilize the appropriate statutory law or reasonable use rule to
determine the outcome.
55
In addition, the supreme court noted that the trial court found
that the plaintiff constructed dams on his land and thus reduced the
gravity of the harm. 56 The trial court denied Young relief because
his self-help measures were not legal under section 61-01-07. 57
Stated simply, section 61-01-07 provides that a person may not
illegally obstruct any ditch, drain, or watercourse that diverts water
from its natural or artificial source. 58 Moreover, the trial court
stated that Young's self-help measures in building dams also
precluded recovery under the reasonable use rule. 59 The North
Dakota Supreme Court stated that the statements of the trial court
were based on an erroneous conception of the reasonable use
doctrine. 60 The court also noted that reasonable use should not be
confused with negligence or contributory negligence; rather,
reasonable use contemplates drainage that is not done negligently
or unreasonably. 61 However, self-help measures may mitigate or
reduce the amount of damages a plaintiff is allowed to recover. 62
The major emphasis of Young v. Hamilton is to clarify existing
case law concerning the reasonable use rule, and to stress that a
finding of fact concerning all relevant circumstances of the case is
necessary before a determination of which law to apply can be
made. 63 In addition, Young v. Hamilton indicates that self-help will
54. Id. at 241. The trial court's opinion stressed that Young's inequitable actions of damming
drainage waters precluded recovery under § 61-01-22 and the reasonable use rule. Id.
55. Id. at 240.
56. Id. at 242. The trial court concluded that Young's self-help actions completely mitigated any
harm caused by defendants' ditching. Id.
57. Id. at 241. The trial court's memorandum opinion stated as follows:
Plaintiffalleges defendants have been guilty ofviolation of Sec. 61-01-22 N.D.C.C. by
reason of their draining without the necessary easements or permits. This is a case of
the pot calling the kettle black as plaintiff himself violated Sec. 61-01-07 of the Code by
plugging the culvert under the Medberry Road and by building his two dams ....
332 N.W.2d at 241.
58. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-07 (Supp. 1983). Section 61-01-07 states in pertinent part as
follows: "If any person illegally obstructs any ditch, drain, or watercourse, or diverts the water
therein from its natural or artificial course, he shall be liable to the party suffering injury from the
obstruction or diversion for the full amount of the damage done .... - Id.
59. 332 N.W.2d at 242-43. The supreme court stated that the trial court unduly relied upon the
equitable principle that one seeking equity must do equity. Id. at 243.
60. Id. at 243. The supreme court noted that the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to strictly
apply a rule casting the burden on each lowland proprietor to protect his own land or a rule strictly
subjecting an upper landowner to liability for interfering with the natural surface flow;- rather the
New Jersey court adopted the reasonable use rule because of its flexibility in requiring the
consideration of all relevant circumstances. Id. See Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120
A.2d 4 (1956).
61. Young, 332 N.W.2d at 243. The court rejected the principle that inequitable conduct would
barr recovery under the reasonable use doctrine. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 244. The court suggested that a determination of the status of the landscape before
drainage should be made by the trial court to resolve which principle of law should apply. Id.
CASE COMMENT
not preclude recovery under the reasonable use rule. 64
One question left unanswered is whether the North Dakota
Supreme Court, by allowing the lowland proprietor to utilize self-
help measure has, therefore, modified the reasonable use rule.
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64. Id. at 243.
65. See supra note 21 for discussion of self-help, a major flaw with the common enemy rule.
19841

